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REFLECTIONS ON THE NATURE OF LABOR 
ARBITRATION 
R. W. Fleming* 
THE use of arbitration as a means of settling labor-management disputes has increased steadily in the past twenty years.1 Recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court have underlined the importance 
of the process.2 The natural tendency is to compare labor arbitra-
tion with the court system as an adjudicatory process. There are, 
however, significant differences between the two, and this needs 
to be better understood. Five important differences, which bear 
further examination, suggest themselves almost immediately. 
1. The arbitrator is a "private" judge who administers a 
"private" system of jurisprudence over which labor and manage-
ment hold joint sovereignty. His oath, insofar as he ever takes one, 
requires only "that he will faithfully and fairly hear and examine 
the matters in controversy . . . and make a just award according 
to the best of his understanding."3 By contrast, the federal judge 
swears to "administer justice without respect to persons [ and] ... 
faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties in-
cumbent on me ... according to the best of my abilities and under-
standing, agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United 
States."-t 
2. The arbitrator, unlike the judge, is chosen by the parties 
who bring the dispute to him. In the absence of agreement by the 
parties the arbitrator is without jurisdiction. 
3. Even under the so-called "permanent" umpireships the 
arbitrator is without effective tenure, and the parties are as free 
to reject his services in the future as they were to nominate him 
in the first instance. 
4. The arbitration tribunal frequently includes partisan mem-
bers who make no pretense of impartiality and who can, at least 
in theory, out-vote the neutral member or members. 
5. A greater premium is placed on the acceptability of an 
• Professor of Law, University of Illinois.-Ed. 
l SLICHTER, HEALY 8: LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGE· 
MENT 739 (1960). 
2 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior &: Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &: Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); 
United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). 
3 Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF AiulITRATORS, THE PRO· 
FESSION OF LABOR AiulITRATION, SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE FIRST SEVEN ANNUAL MEETINGS 
1948-1954, at 153, 157 (McKelvey ed. 1957). 
-t 28 U.S.C. § 453 (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
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arbitrator's award by the parties in a dispute than would normally 
be the case with a court decision. 
An intelligent evaluation of the differences, and of the labor 
arbitration tribunal in general, can be made only after an explora-
tion of its origin and history, and after some consideration of the 
kinds of cases which are submitted for decision. 
I. ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR ARBITRATION 
The tremendous growth of grievance arbitration is a phe-
nomenon of the post-World War II period. This is not surprising. 
Grievance arbitration presupposes the existence of collective bar-
gaining agreements. Collective bargaining agreements, in turn, 
presuppose union organization. The great growth in the labor 
movement, especially in the mass production industries, occurred 
in the years following passage of the Wagner Act in 1935.5 That 
law was widely disregarded until it was held to be constitutional 
in 1937.6 Thereafter, unions were primarily concerned with or-
ganizational problems until the advent of World War II in 1939, 
and our own entry into the war in 1941. Because of the war, labor 
disputes could not be tolerated and were therefore made subject 
to the jurisdiction of the War Labor Board. That body, engaged 
as it was in settlement of controversies over the terms of new agree-
ments, could hardly permit itself to become embroiled in day-to-
day grievances. For that reason the Board, in July 1943, issued a 
policy statement indicating that a contractual grievance procedure 
should provide for the "final and binding settlement of all griev-
ances not otherwise resolved. For this purpose provisions should 
be made for the settlement of grievances by an arbitrator, impar-
tial chairman or umpire . . . ."7 During the balance of the war 
years grievance arbitration clauses were included in thousands 
of agreements, either by direct order of the War Labor Board or 
because of its indirect influence. 
Although grievance arbitration clauses were included in a 
great many contracts during the war period by government fiat, 
labor and management grew to accept the practice. When Presi-
dent Truman convened his Labor-Management Conference in the 
fall of 1945, a tripartite subcommittee was able to reach unani-
mous agreement that contracts should provide "by mutual agree-
5 Derber, Growth and Expansion, in LAnoR AND THE NEW DEAL 1 (Derber &: Young 
ed. 1957). 
6 NLRB v. Jones&: Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
7 1 NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD TERMINATION REPORT 66 (1943). 
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ment for the final determination of any unsettled grievances or 
disputes involving the interpretation or application of the agree-
ment by an impartial chairman, umpire, arbitrator, or board."8 
The accident of timing which brought a major war just at the 
moment when collective bargaining agreements were greatly in-
creasing largely explains the vast expansion in grievance arbitra-
tion. But it does little to explain the nature of the arbitration 
tribunal, with which we are primarily concerned. One must look 
to an earlier period of history to gain insight as to that question. 
In his Historical Survey of Labor Arbitration, Professor Edwin 
E. Witte pointed out that it is difficult to trace the beginnings of 
labor arbitration in the United States because the term has been 
used to connote quite different things.9 In its earliest stage it meant 
what we would now call "collective bargaining," and at subse-
quent stages it often meant what we would now call either "media-
tion" or "conciliation." Moreover, up to and including World 
War I the emphasis was not, as it is now, on arbitration as a final 
step in the grievance procedure, but rather as a device for resolv-
ing "interest" disputes over the terms of new contracts. Perhaps 
because the emphasis in arbitration during this period tended to 
be on "interest" disputes, rather than those involving contractual 
"rights," President Wilson was unable to get agreement on the 
arbitration principle when he convened a National Industrial 
Conference in 1919.10 
After World War I, some observers thought that they detected 
a developing "industrial law" growing out of arbitration experi-
ences like those in the clothing industry. On this point Professor 
Witte observed: 
"The process of arbitration was looked upon not merely as 
an expedient for the settlement of labor disputes but as in-
volving the substitution of the rule of law in industrial rela-
tions for the prior settlement of disputes through the ordeal 
of combat .... Before the end of the twenties, however, arbi-
tration in this industry had become much less formal. The 
arbitrators generally looked upon what they were doing as the 
finding of workable solutions for specific disagreements rather 
than of promulgating principles to be observed in the future 
relations of the parties."11 
8 SLICHTER, HEALY &: LIVERNASH, op. cit. supra note I, at 747. 
9 WITTE, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF LABOR .ARBITRATION 3 (1952). 
10 Id. at 32. 
11 Id. at 37-38. (Emphasis added.) 
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From the end of World War I to the coming of the New Deal 
there appears to have been a modest, but unspectacular, growth 
in · grievance arbitration. A significant breakthrough, prior to 
World War II, came in 1937 when General Motors, having just 
recognized the UAW on a members-only basis, agreed to a con-
tract which contained a provision stating that the parties might, 
by mutual consent, refer any unresolved grievance to an impar-
tial umpire.12 This clause was apparently used only twice, but the 
1940 agreement between the parties established the umpire sys-
tem which still obtains.13 In the interim period both the union and 
the company reached the independent conclusion that work inter-
ruptions arising out of grievances were undesirable and to be 
avoided through some kind of third-party procedure.14 Signifi-
cantly, the company thought of this as an adjudicative procedure, 
as the following extract from a management policy statement in-
dicates: 
"Management is charged with the responsibility for promot-
ing and maintaining the best long-term interests of the 
business as a continuing institution. Therefore, while manage-
ment should exhaust every means in endeavoring to settle 
all problems of employer-employee relations that may arise, 
it cannot agree to submit to arbitration (which is a surrender 
by both sides to the authority of an outside agency) any point 
at issue where compromise might injure the long-term in-
terests of the business and therefore, in turn, damage the mass 
of employees themselves. 
"This does not in any way mean that impartial or judicial 
agencies have no place in collective bargaining. On the con-
trary, controversial questions of fact, such as discrimination 
cases and questions of layoff, may frequently be more ami-
cably and speedily settled through an impartial, competent, 
fact-finding agency having the confidence of both sides."15 
The impact of World War II on labor arbitration has already 
been discussed. Many umpireships, like the one between Chrysler 
and the UAW, are part of this history.16 The Chrysler umpire, 
12 Alexander, Impartial Umpireships: The General Motors-UAW Experience, in NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARllITRATORS, ARllITRATION AND THE LAW, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH 
ANNUAL MEETING 108, llO (McKelvey ed. 1959). 
13 Id. at 111. 
14 Id. at 112-16. 
15 Id. at 116. 
16 Wolff, Crane &: Cole, The Chrysler-UAW Umpire System, in NATIONAL ACADEMY 
OF .ArulITRATORS, THE ARllITRATOR AND THE PARTIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ANNUAL 
MEETING 111, 113 (McKelvey ed. 1958). 
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incidentally, became the impartial chairman of a pre-existing 
board of appeals which consisted of two representatives of the 
corporation and two representatives of the union. 
II. THE KINDS OF CASES BEFORE LABOR ARBITRATORS 
The kinds of cases which come before a tribunal often go 
a long way toward explaining the tribunal. Professor Fuller has 
pointed out, for instance, that arbitrators are often asked to resolve 
issues which the courts might have labelled non-justiciable.17 
There are doubtless many ways in which one could classify the 
cases coming before labor arbitrators. For present purposes, any 
classification system which offers some insight into the wide variety 
of cases will do. One might, therefore, divide the cases into four 
groups: (I) contract interpretation cases, (2) "legislation" cases, 
(3) "policy" cases, and (4) "interest" cases. These categories over-
lap, and further refinement is necessary in order to indicate what 
is meant in each instance. 
A. Contract Interpretation Cases 
By far the largest single category of cases which come before 
labor arbitrators involves what might be described as straight con-
tract interpretation cases. Was A discharged for just cause when 
he allegedly violated the rules by smoking in a dangerous area? 
Does B, who is the senior man, have the ability to perform a cer-
tain job in which his seniority will prevail if he has the necessary 
qualifications? Should •c, D, and Ebe paid for non-working time 
during a power failure not attributable to the company? Did the 
company wrongfully deny certain work to F, G, and H when they 
customarily performed such work? Did J have to take another 
physical examination when he returned from sick leave? Must K 
work both the day before and the day after a holiday in order 
to qualify for holiday pay? Did L, who quit his job after the 
vacation period began, qualify for vacation pay? These questions 
are the grist of the labor arbitration mill. In quantity they go to 
make up the great bulk of the cases which are presented. This is 
not to say that the answers are easy in such cases; indeed, it may be 
very hard to find satisfactory or convincing answers. But at least 
there is, by hypothesis, contract language bearing on the point. 
The difficulty is likely to be one of proof (e.g., in the discharge 
17 Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ArulI-
TRATORS, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE ARIIITRATOR'S ROLE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH 
ANNUAL MEETING 8, 37 (Kahn ed. 1962). 
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and promotion cases), or of determining what the parties meant 
by certain contract language (as in the power failure and holiday pay 
cases). With respect to the latter category, it may be that the parties 
never thought of the problem and therefore had no intended 
meaning. In that case the problem falls more nearly into what is 
here classified as the "legislation" category. Often, however, the 
parties will argue vigorously that they did anticipate the problem 
at hand and that the language, which may seem subject to more 
than one interpretation, was understood by both parties to have 
a definite meaning. 
B. "Legislation" Cases 
Every arbitrator sooner or later finds himself faced with the 
case in which the parties quite obviously failed to anticipate the 
situation which has arisen. Nevertheless, the arbitrator is asked 
to resolve the dispute by applying language which was written 
for another purpose. These cases are best illustrated by example. 
In a transit case the company and the union had signed a 
three-year contract. During negotiations a difficult issue had been 
the application of a cost-of-living formula. Under the old contract 
there was a one-cent adjustment in the wage rate for every one-
point change in the index. The union argued, and the company 
agreed, that this formula was inequitable since a one-cent change 
in the wage rate did not necessarily equal a one-point change in 
the index on a percentage basis. The new contract provided that 
there should be a percentage adjustment in wages, and that this 
would be calculated quarterly. The new contract also called for 
several deferred increases over the period of the contract. Every-
thing went along smoothly for about two years. Then some of the 
employees received checks containing less than they calculated 
was due them under the deferred increase and cost-of-living for-
mulas. On checking with the company, it was discovered that the 
company and the union had been proceeding on different theories 
which, up to then, had not resulted in any difference in wages. 
The company understood that cost-of-living adjustments were to 
be made on the base wage which existed at the time the contract 
was signed. The union understood that cost-of-living adjustments 
would be made on the current base rate which would include any 
deferred increases. The contract simply provided that cost-of-
living adjustments would be made on the "base rate." Since this 
provision could be read to support either position, a grievance was 
filed. Ultimately, the issue came to arbitration. At the hearing the 
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union argued that it was sure that in negotiations it had mentioned 
cost-of-living adjustments based on currently existing rates, but it 
admitted that this point had not been discussed at any length. 
The company frankly stated that its representatives had no recol-
lection of any discussions on the subject, but that if the subject 
had been discussed the company was sure that its past position 
would not have differed from the one now espoused. From the 
arbitrator's standpoint it appeared to be a case in which the parties 
had simply not anticipated the problem. Arriving at a decision by 
interpreting the contract language would involve a conclusion as 
to what the parties would have thought about the problem had 
they thought about it. Courts frequently face this dilemma in 
connection with the interpretation of legislation.18 However, this 
analogy only serves to illustrate that the arbitrator, in arriving at 
such a decision, would operate as a legislator rather than an ad-
judicator. 
In another case the contract provided that as to Saturday 
work the first four hours would be compensated at time-and-one-
half, and the second four hours would call for double-time. The 
plant operated on two shifts, but never in history had the second 
shift worked on Saturday. Suddenly an emergency arose which 
required that the second shift work on Saturdays for a two-month 
period. What should the compensation be? Frankly admitting that 
the contract did not contemplate the problem, the company never-
theless argued that the "spirit" of the contract was that the first 
four hours for anyone working on Saturday would be paid at 
time-and-one-half, and the second four hours at double-time. The 
union argued that since the contract actually read that time-and-
one-half would be paid until noon, and double-time in the after-
noon, all hours after noon must be regarded as double-time hours. 
At the same time the union conceded that the problem had not 
been anticipated when the contract was written. An arbitrator 
could reach a decision by applying the contract language, but he 
could hardly pretend that in doing so he was simply carrying out 
the original wishes of the parties, for they had no such prior in-
formed intent. It may be, as the company argued, that the "spirit" 
of the contract was that any Saturday work should be compensated 
according to the contractual pattern. This conclusion could, in 
18 Cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), in which 
the Supreme Court was asked to rule on the question of whether the hiring of a clergy• 
man by a New York church violated the prohibition of the Alien Labor Act against 
contracting with an alien for "labor or service of any kind.'' 
1252 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61 
fact, be documented by showing an "area practice" involving this 
particular union and other employers. But one could hardly say 
that this was what the parties meant, when clearly they had never 
thought of the problem. A result which would favor the union 
might be reached by extending the literal language of the contract 
so that any hours beyond noon on Saturday called for double-
time. But this outcome, too, would hardly qualify as an instance 
of straight contract interpretation, for the result would fly in the 
face of the admission of the parties that they never intended the 
language to cover the situation at hand. The upshot was that any 
decision which the arbitrator announced would be, in a very real 
sense, either his estimate of what the parties would have done had 
they thought about the problem, or his estimate of what was the 
"best" interpretation of the contract under the circumstances. 
In either case the arbitrator would exercise "the sovereign prerog-
ative of choice." 
A third, and final, illustration involves a not infrequent senior-
ity case. A small company found itself faced with the necessity for 
quick expansion during the Korean conflict. Production workers 
could be readily hired, but the acquisition of supervisory talent of-
fered more serious obstacles. The result was that a long-time produc-
tion worker was promoted to a supervisory position in which he 
worked for two years. When the Korean conflict ended, the com-
pany returned to its peacetime labor force and cut back both in its 
supervisory and production ranks. The employee in question was 
bumped from supervision into production. A question then arose 
as to his seniority rights. The contract contained the usual pro-
visions on termination of seniority, triggered by events such as 
leaving the company, or by lay-off for more than two years. Pressed 
by other members who were about to lose their jobs on lay-off, 
the union argued that the promoted employee had lost all his 
seniority when he chose to enter the supervisory ranks. The com-
pany argued that as a minimum he retained what he had when he 
became a supervisor. Both sides conceded that the problem was a 
new one to them, and that in writing the contract they had not 
thought of it. An arbitrator could, of course, reach a decision in 
such a case. But in doing so he could hardly say that he was sim-
ply applying the contract because both sides freely admitted that 
the contract was not written in contemplation of the problem. 
Whatever the rationale, therefore, the resolution of the matter 
would more nearly represent legislation than contract interpreta-
tion. 
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C. "Policy" Cases 
The "policy" case, as defined herein, refers to the situation in 
which the arbitrator is asked to apply some vaguely defined in-
dustrial relations value without reference to the contract language. 
Such cases often arise out of strike situations and form a part of the 
settlement agreement which terminates the work stoppage. Ex-
amples will again best serve to illustrate the point. 
A brewery found itself faced with the necessity for transfer-
ring three employees from the garage to the trucking division. 
Before the move was announced, a rumor, which greatly exag-
gerated the situation, swept through the plant. The result was a 
work stoppage in violation of the contract. The matter was finally 
settled by an agreement to refer to arbitration two items: (I) 
whether the company violated the contract by the proposed change 
in the method of operation, and (2), if so, whether the company had 
a "moral" obligation to pay the employees for those hours during 
which the work stoppage took place. By agreeing to submit the 
second question, the company must have realized that it was giving 
the arbitrator much more room to maneuver than if it had in-
sisted upon a simple decision as to whether, under the terms of the 
contract, the men were entitled to be paid. There was no doubt 
that the stoppage was in violation of the contract, and as a straight 
contract issue it would have been extremely difficult for the ar-
bitrator to justify pay for men who were in violation of their own 
promise. By placing the issue on "moral" grounds, however, the 
union had room, which it utilized, to argue that the procedures 
which the company used in preparing for the change were such 
as to provoke the stoppage, and that the company was therefore 
morally bound to pay for the lost time. 
In the first paragraph of his decision the arbitrator clearly set 
forth the dimensions of the problem which faced him. He said: 
"We are here concerned with the moral and not the legal 
obligations of the parties. These involve questions of the 
'right and wrong' and the 'ought and ought not' of labor-
management relationships, the answers to which are enforced 
by a command of conscience rather than by the sanctions of 
law. These relationships are constantly changing and the tests 
and standards applied to them are uncertain. In part, this 
stems from the fact that a great many aspects of the relation-
ships are functional in character and there are substantial 
differences about how to fulfill them properly and effectively. 
In part, it also stems from the fact that the idea of 'right and 
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wrong' in labor-management relationships is modified by 
changes in the concept of right and wrong in society at large. 
As a result, there are no universally accepted commandments 
in this area. "19 
The long and bitter Wilson and Company strike in the fall 
of 1959 led to a somewhat similar arbitration. Settlement came 
after the men had been out for three and one-half months and the 
company had hired a substantial number of replacements. This 
meant that on the termination of the strike there would be many 
fewer jobs than the combined total of the newly hired and the 
older employees. Such a situation invariably renders a strike much 
more difficult to settle. A solution which was acceptable to both 
sides was arbitration. Since the contract had long since expired, 
there could be no contractual issue. The company was reluctant 
to take back any strikers who were alleged to have participated in 
unlawful or unprotected activity. On the other hand, the union 
was reluctant to see the rights of the strikers determined by what 
it considered to be "narrow legal principles." The result was that 
the board of arbitration was asked "to decide, in the light of all the 
equities and all facts and considerations deemed by the Board to 
be relevant, the fair and proper disposition of all issues in respect 
to all employees affected .... "20 
By giving the board of arbitration power to deal with the 
"equities," and to make "fair and proper disposition" of the is-
sues, the parties were in effect throwing themselves on the mercy 
of the board without giving the board much of a standard by 
which to decide. It would be naive to suppose that the parties 
did not know this. The standards were deliberately vague because 
only in this fashion could a mutually agreeable stipulation be 
reached. 
D. "Interest" Cases 
The "interest" cases, as that term is here used, are those cases 
in which the parties have chosen to submit to arbitration the 
determination of the terms of a new contract. There is relatively 
little of this kind of arbitration in the United States, and what 
there is deals primarily with the question of wages.21 Both labor 
and management tend to oppose interest arbitration, though it 
19 From an unpublished opinion furnished to the writer in confidence . 
.20 Wilson &: Co., 34 Lab. Arb. 125, 126 (1960). 
21 BERNSTEIN, ARBITRATION OF WAGES (1954). 
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has been suggested that their fears are unwarranted.22 The success-
ful use of interest arbitration to resolve remaining issues in the 
difficult Chicago and Northwestern and Southern Pacific railroad 
cases during the past year may somewhat change its image. In 
both cases, however, prolonged negotiations settled most of the 
issues prior to arbitration, and it was only after a serious strike 
that arbitration was agreed upon in the Chicago and Northwestern 
case. 
Costly and disruptive strikes involving railroads, airlines, ship-
ping, missiles, and newspapers have recently increased interest in 
compulsory arbitration as a device for settling interest disputes. 
This is not the place for an extended analysis of compulsory ar-
bitration. It is important in the present context, however, to 
recognize that compulsory arbitration is different both in kind 
and in degree from voluntary arbitration. It is different in kind 
because consent implies acceptance of generally recognized stand-
ards which will determine the outcome of the case. It is this ac-
quiescence in known standards which makes the dispute amenable 
to a decision by a third party. Wages, for instance, are commonly 
set by comparison with the cost of living, productivity, area and 
industry standards, and inequities. When the parties agree to sub-
mit a wage issue to arbitration, they know that the outcome will 
be determined by the effectiveness of their arguments in relation 
to these or other accepted criteria. By contrast, an unwillingness 
to submit a wage issue to arbitration is likely to mean that one 
or both parties reject a conclusion based on such standards. One 
may be seeking a breakthrough, and the other a breakaway. This 
fact changes the whole character of the proceeding. In such a case 
experience suggests that an unacceptable decision, which may very 
well mean a decision based on the usual criteria, will be rejected 
despite sanctions provided in the law.23 This inevitably pushes 
the arbitrator in the direction of mediation rather than arbitration. 
Compulsory arbitration catches the parties in the bargaining 
stage, and collective bargaining is legislative rather than judicial 
in character. Either side may demand that the other bargain over 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, and 
the parties may go even further and bargain about other legal 
22 Handsaker, Arbitration and Contract Disputes, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF Aru11-
TRATORS, CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH ANNUAL MEETING 78, 92 
(McKelvey ed. 1960). 
23 Kennedy, The Handling of Emergency Disputes, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH 
Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS OF SECOND ANNUAL MEETING 24 (1949). 
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issues which do not fall within the above categories.24 The prob-
lem is much like that of political parties before the legislature. 
Each party has a program which it hopes to get adopted. Each 
knows that it will not be wholly successful. Indeed, the only ques-
tion is how much of what one wants one can get. Progress is 
achieved through compromise, elimination, and trading. To sug-
gest that one apply compulsory arbitration at the end of a legisla-
tive session to those items as to which the parties remain in dis-
agreement would be unthinkable. Yet, the legislative process is 
much like collective bargaining. The difference comes at the next 
step. If the legislature is unable to agree, the status quo will not 
be disturbed. If labor and management cannot agree, a strike or 
lockout will ensue. This difference doubtless justifies dissimilar 
treatment. Unfortunately, it does not change the fact that the 
underlying problem is legislative in character and therefore not 
readily amenable to adjudicatory techniques. An example will 
illustrate the point. 
One of the major disputes of the past year involved the 
Atlantic and Gulf Coast maritime industry and the longshore-
men. Following a strike, the President appointed an emergency 
board under the Taft-Hartley Act. The board reported that there 
had been a complete failure in collective bargaining.25 The union 
had submitted a long list of demands which included wages, length 
of the working day, improvement of pensions, major medical 
coverage, increase in penalty cargo rates, vacation contributions 
and entitlements, eligibility for holidays, and severance pay at 
terminated operations. The employers responded with an even 
longer list which included, among other things, night shift dif-
ferentials, flexibility of meal hours, elimination of travel time 
within the Port of New York, guarantees to men working after 
noon, obligation of the union to provide labor for overtime work, 
discipline for unexcused absenteeism, right of the employer to 
cancel work under adverse weather conditions, royalties on bulk 
sugar and containers, and clarification of the employers' rights in 
using the work force. These demands and counter-demands re-
mained substantially the same right up to the time of the final 
settlement before the board chaired by Senator Morse. If that 
board had failed, compulsory arbitration might well have been 
required by Congress. What issues would then be before the 
24 Fleming, The Obligation To Bargain in Good Faith, 47 VA. L. REv. 988 (1961). 
25 N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1962, p. 1, col. 2. 
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arbitrators? Presumably all of the demands which remained un-
settled, plus the scores of local issues which had not even been 
touched. But such an arbitration would be both interminable and 
unmanageable. Inevitably the arbitrators would be required to 
mediate until they had reduced the dispute to manageable propor-
tions. Even at that late stage, the arbitrators might be inclined 
to mediate because the dispute would be one which, by definition, 
would not lend itself to solution by application of known and 
accepted criteria. 
It was said earlier that compulsory and voluntary arbitration 
are different not only in kind but in degree. Much of what has 
been said up to this point illustrates the difference in kind. There 
is also a very great difference in degree. When an arbitrator decides 
a seniority question under a contract, he is dealing with the secu-
rity of one or more individuals. By contrast, practically every 
major dispute in the past year has involved the security of a great 
many employees against unemployment-particularly against the 
advance of machines. Where are the guidelines for an arbitrator 
in such a case? Granted that technological change is esssential, 
what is the obligation of the business to the displaced employee? 
Is he entitled to follow his job to another location? What about 
his pension rights? Is he entitled to severance pay and/or re-
education benefits? Must the employer reduce his work comple-
ment only by attrition so that individual employees will not be 
hurt? The answer to these questions can be tremendously costly 
to the employer and devastating to the employee. It will be hard 
for any outsider to know the exact impact of a proposed decision. 
This will once again exert pressure on the arbitrators to mediate. 
Quite apart from the question of acceptability, they will worry 
about feasibility. Feasibility is not an unknown concern to the 
grievance arbitrator, but its order of importance is normally far 
less than in the case of issues subject to compulsory arbitration. 
Finally, there is the problem of enforcing an award imposed 
against the will of the parties. Distasteful as the thought may be, 
there is a serious problem in this area, and it has no real parallel 
in the voluntary proceeding. Wise heads have counselled that one 
must never disclose the impotency of a democracy. President de 
Gaulle, surely as strong a democratic leader as the world can offer, 
encountered the problem recently when the French coal miners 
struck against the government. Despite legislation which enabled 
him to impose his will on the miners, the French leader was un-
successful in ending the strike until an agreed settlement was 
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made.26 The Australian experience with compulsory awards fur-
ther documents the difficulty of enforcing an unpopular decision.27 
In such cases continued negotiations, rather than application of 
legal sanctions, are likely to be required if success is to be achieved. 
There are, then, substantial differences between compulsory 
and voluntary arbitration. The latter is much more amenable to 
adjudicatory procedures than is the former. In part this is because 
the stakes are higher when interests rather than rights are involved. 
But if this were all that mattered one might nevertheless see a 
perceptible movement toward voluntary interest arbitration. The 
more important distinction between compulsory and voluntary 
arbitration is that inability to agree on arbitration when interests 
are involved implies inability to accept recognized criteria for 
settlement. When this is true, normal arbitral techniques must be 
applied with caution. The institutional pressures which surround 
such situations will inevitably move a compulsory board of ar-
bitration in the direction of mediation. 
The fact that there are difficulties in the way of compulsory 
arbitration does not mean that we will not, or even should not, 
require it in some cases. The record of collective bargaining is so 
dismal in some industries that it has little to recommend it. One 
of the most vulnerable is the maritime industry, where legislation 
is now pending to require arbitration.28 For purposes of the pres-
ent article, it is enough to note that compulsory and voluntary 
arbitration involve quite different procedures and that the great 
success of voluntary arbitration means little in terms of whether 
compulsory arbitration can ever succeed. 
III. COURTS AND ARBITRATION TRIBUNALS 
There are, as was suggested earlier, some pointed differences 
between courts and labor arbitration tribunals. There is also a 
long-standing dispute among arbitrators as to whether labor ar-
bitration is an extension of collective bargaining or a judicial-type 
proceeding.29 In essence, this is a dispute over whether arbitrators 
26 Id., April 4, 1963, p. 1, col. 1. 
21 PERLMAN, JUDGES IN INDUSIRY 181-82 (1954). 
28 H.R. 1897, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). 
29 Cf. Davey, The John Deere-UAW Permanent Arbitration System, in NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, CRITICAL ISSUES IN LABOR ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
!Ora ANNUAL MEETING 161 (McKelvey ed. 1957); Morse, The Judicial Theory of Arbi• 
tration, in UNIONS, MANAGEMENT, AND THE PUBLIC 489 (Bakke 8c Kerr ed. 1948); Taylor, 
Effectuating the Labor Contract Through Arbitration, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBI-
TRATORS, THE PROFESSION OF LABOR ARBITRATION, SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE FIRST SEVEN 
ANNUAL MEETINGS 1948-1954, at 20 (McKelvey ed. 1957). 
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should mediate.30 One suspects that it is a debate which rests in 
large part on false assumptions. The notion that courts never 
mediate is an illusion. Particularly since the advent of the pre-
trial conference, there have been an increased number of settle-
ments. 31 The literature on court behavior in this respect suggests 
that there may be as much variation among courts32 as between 
the GM-UAW and hosiery industry umpireships.33 
A clearer perspective as to the differences between labor ar-
bitration tribunals and courts may emerge if we now return to 
the five significant points of difference which were set forth at 
the outset. 
I. The "Private" Law of the Arbitration Tribunal 
A court of general jurisdiction handles both civil and criminal 
cases, and in either event the governing "law" does not emanate 
from the parties before the court. Much the same may be said for 
the special court, e.g., a tax court, except that its jurisdiction will 
be more limited. The labor arbitration tribunal is faced with the 
rather unique fact that the parties have written the "law" over 
which the tribunal is given jurisdiction, and that, whatever the 
outcome of the case, it is the firm intention of the parties to 
continue living together. Not even the domestic relations court 
finds itself in that position. 
Judges take an oath to uphold the law of the jurisdiction in 
which they are appointed. Arbitrators, if they take an oath at all, 
simply swear that they will make a just award according to the 
best of their understanding. This does not mean that arbitrators 
can act as if they were under a different sovereign, immune from 
local, state, and federal laws. Indeed, courts have from time to 
time held arbitration awards invalid on the ground that they were 
contrary to the law, or against public policy. This happened in the 
·western Union case,34 where an arbitrator had awarded back pay 
to certain individuals who had been suspended for deliberately 
refusing to deliver certain cable messages originating in a strike-
bound section of the company. The reviewing court said that such 
30 In this connection, see Code of Ethics for Arbitrators, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
ARBrrnATORS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 153. 
31 Sunderland, Problems Connected with the Operation of a State Court System, 
1950 WIS. L. REv. 585, 594-99. 
32 Id. at 598-99. 
33 Cf. Alexander, supra note 12, at 142; KENNEDY, EFFECTIVE LABOR ARBrrnATION 57 
(1948). 
34 Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 299 N.Y. 177, 86 
N.E.2d 162 (1949). 
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a ruling was contrary to the law of the state, and was therefore in-
valid. Likewise, a California court set aside an arbitration award 
in which an arbitrator had reinstated a woman who was alleged 
to be a communist. In its decision the California Supreme Court 
seemed to say that reinstatement would be against the public 
policy of the state, though the United States Supreme Court later 
chose to give the decision a more restricted meaning.35 In another 
area, the National Labor Relations Board has always insisted that 
it has exclusive jurisdiction over discharges alleged to be for union 
activity, and that, while it may choose to recognize an arbitrator's 
award in such a case, this is purely in the discretion of the Board. 36 
Nevertheless, within the broad limits of the law, the arbitrator is 
free to apply the purely private law of the parties to the collective 
bargaining contract without interference from the state. And in 
doing so he will not only face the same litigants over and over 
again to the exclusion of all others, but those litigants will have 
written the "law" which he is expected to administer. No judge 
ever finds himself in quite this position. 
Perhaps it will be said that the term "law" is much too broad 
to apply to the category of cases which will face the labor arbitra-
tion tribunal. In fact, if one leaves aside the limited number of 
"interest" cases, the tribunal will simply interpret a contract, and 
contract law is, after all, a very limited phase of the entire body 
of law. But this begs the question, for it ignores the nature of the 
labor-management contract. American courts have long been 
troubled by the fact that the labor contract does not look quite 
like other contracts, and the English courts have simply treated 
them as unenforceable. In the classic J. I. Case decision, Mr. 
Justice Jackson said of the collective bargaining agreement: 
"Without pushing the analogy too far, the agreement may b€; 
likened to the tariffs established by a carrier, to standard 
provisions prescribed by supervising authorities for insurance 
policies, or to utility schedules of rates and rules for service, 
which do not of themselves establish any relationships but 
which do govern the terms of the shipper or insurer or cus-
tomer relationship wherever and with whomever it may be 
established."31 
The present Solicitor General, Archibald Cox, once detailed 
35 Black v. Cutter Lab., 43 Cal. 2d 788, 278 P.2d 905, cert. granted, 350 U.S. 816 
(1955), cert. dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). 
36 Monsanto Chem. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1098 (1961). See also NLRB v. Disney 
Prods., 146 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 877 (1945). 
31 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 335 (1944). 
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four significant ways in which the labor contract differed from 
other contracts: (1) in the number of persons affected, and the 
complexity of their interrelationships ("If we think of the union 
as an agent and the employees as principals, we have the paradox 
that the agent is the principals acting as an organization"38); 
(2) in the range of conduct and variety of problems covered; 
(3) by operating prospectively over a substantial period; and (4) in 
the fact that the parties share a degree of mutual interdependence 
which is seldom associated with simple contracts.39 
Dean Shulman summed it up this way: 
"To be sure, the parties are seeking to bind one another and 
to define 'rights' and 'obligations' for the future. But it is 
also true that, with respect to nonwage matters particularly, 
the parties are dealing with hypothetical situations that may 
or may not arise. Both sides are interested in the welfare of 
the enterprise. Neither would unashamedly seek contractual 
commitments that would destroy the other. Each has conflicts 
of interests in its own ranks. Both might be content to leave 
the future to discretion, if they had full confidence in that 
discretion and in its full acceptance when exercised. And 
even when the negotiating representatives have full confi-
dence in each other as individuals, they recognize that it 
will be many others, not they, who will play major roles in 
the administration of the agreement. So they seek to provide 
a rule of law which will eliminate or reduce the areas of 
discretion. The agreement then becomes a compilation of 
diverse provisions: some provide objective criteria almost 
automatically applicable; some provide more or less specific 
standards which require reason and judgment in their ap-
plication; and some do little more than leave problems to 
future consideration with an expression of hope and good 
faith."40 
There is perhaps one other comment which remains to be 
made about the private "law" which the arbitration tribunal 
administers. Private though it is, and different though it may be 
from typical contract law, it is not wholly different, and this is 
of considerable importance. Many questions of contract inter-
pretation before arbitration tribunals do look like typical con-
38 Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration in the Light of the Lincoln Mills Case, 
in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, ARBITRATION AND THE LAw, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
12TH ANNUAL MEETING 34 (M:cKelvey ed. 1959). 
so Id. at 33-37. 
40 Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999, 
1005 (1955). 
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tract interpretation cases which come before courts-does the con-
tract require that an employee work both the day before and the 
day after a holiday in order to qualify for holiday pay;41 did the 
contract permit the purchaser to recover his deposit on a pur-
chase of realty if he did not sell certain lots within sixty days?42 
Many of the cases in which arbitration tribunals are asked, in 
effect, to legislate do look like cases in which courts are called 
upon to interpret statutes-did X retain his seniority when pro-
moted from the production ranks to a supervisory position;43 
does the Motor Vehicle Theft Act apply to airplanes as well as 
automobiles?44 Some of the policy cases which come before ar-
bitration tribunals do look like similar issues before courts-does 
the company have a moral obligation to pay employees during a 
work stoppage;45 is the Connecticut birth control law an infringe-
ment of the rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment?46 
Because this is so, arbitrators draw heavily on the experience of 
courts, and upon concepts developed by the courts. An excellent 
illustration, which could be repeated ad infinitum, is the rather 
consistent ruling of arbitrators that lie detector evidence is in-
admissible in an arbitration proceeding because the courts, in 
similar circumstances, have not thought it reliable.41 
In summary, it is evident that the labor arbitration tribunal 
is unique, in that it has only one set of party litigants and that 
these litigants have themselves drafted the laws which are being 
interpreted. On the other hand, the tribunal is not immune from 
the sovereignty of the state, and there is sufficient comparability 
between its work and that of the courts so that arbitrators rely 
heavily on concepts developed by the courts. Overall, the prin-
ciples which guide courts and arbitration tribunals are doubtless 
more alike than different. Nevertheless, the differences are of such 
a critical nature that they must be kept in mind. 
2. The Arbitrator Is the Choice of the Parties 
In either the ad hoc or permanent umpire situation the ar-
bitrator is the mutual choice of the parties. Doubtless in any given 
instance one could measure varying degrees of enthusiasm with 
41 See Greif Bros. Cooperage Corp., 34 Lab. Arb. 283 (1960); American Chain &: Cable 
Co., 21 Lab. Arb. 15 (1953). 
42 Woods v. De Marigny, 59 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 1952). 
43 Aermotor Co., 30 Lab. Arb. 663 (1958). 
44 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931). 
45 See text at note 19 supra. 
46 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
47 Brass-Craft Mfg. Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 1177 (1961). 
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which the parties make the choice, but the fact remains that in 
the kind of situation we are discussing no one imposes an ar-
bitrator on the parties. A judge, on the other hand, is either ap-
pointed or elected through procedures not controlled by particular 
litigants. The parties who will appear before a judge will at most 
have had only a rather remote connection with his selection. This 
does not mean that disputing parties to a legal case will have no 
choice whatsoever as to the forum in which they appear. Rather 
wide choices may be available as between going into a federal or 
a state court, into one federal court rather than another, into one 
state court rather than another, or before one judge rather than 
another within a given geographical jurisdiction. There is no 
doubt that lawyers are conscious of the possibilities inherent in 
this situation and that they try to take advantage of it.48 Much the 
same thing can be said of the possibilities for a change of venue 
taken for the purpose of bringing the matter before another 
court.40 But in each of these situations the choice will be between 
judges already in office, and the parties will never have an op-
portunity directly to name their own judge. 
But perhaps when we contrast the selection of judges and 
labor arbitrators we are trying to compare two not very compa-
rable situations. Ad hoc arbitration probably constitutes the great 
volume of this kind of business, and it is normally associated with 
parties who do not have sufficient business to warrant retaining 
a permanent umpire. The feasible alternative for them-and per-
haps even for the relationship which does warrant a permanent 
umpire-would be a staff of government arbitrators who would 
be available on call. New York and Wisconsin have long provided 
such a service. At one time, immediately after World War II, 
the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service did likewise. 
Perhaps the best example of all is found in the railroad industry, 
where adjustment boards have been provided for years at public 
expense. In this connection, it is of interest that a recent report 
made under the auspices of the Committee for Economic Devel-
opment suggested that the railroad adjustment board procedure 
be abandoned in favor of the kind of private arbitration found in 
the balance of industry.50 The New York and Wisconsin proce-
dures continue to render valuable service to small companies and 
48 Cf. Daily Labor Report No. 218, Nov. 7, 1962 p. A-1, in which the race between 
the Darlington Mfg. Co. and the Textile ·workers Union of America to obtain review 
of the NLRB's order before the 4th Circuit versus the D.C. Circuit is reported. 
40 Cf. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 146, § 1 (1961). 
150 COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN NATIONAL LABOR 
POLICY 105 (1961). 
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unions in those states. However, the Federal Mediation and Con-
ciliation Service found that continuation of its arbitration service 
was incompatible with its principal function of mediation and 
conciliation, and therefore abandoned it. 51 
Another possible alternative would be to turn in the direction 
which most of the Western European countries have taken, and 
to establish labor courts. 52 It can be argued that this would offer 
certain advantages, but little serious attention has been given the 
subject of utilizing the courts except as a possible alternative to 
the general jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board 
over unfair labor practices. 53 
Both of the principal appointing agencies, the American Ar-
bitration Association and the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service, will, on request, appoint arbitrators in given situa-
tions, but this is not frequently done and the agencies have 
shown little enthusiasm for such a role.54 
The inescapable conclusion on methods of selecting labor 
arbitrators is that there is no very feasible alternative short of a 
system of labor courts, or government appointment. Both of these 
alternatives have been tried, either here or abroad. But, outside 
the railroad industry, there appears to be little disposition, in this 
country, to turn in such a direction. 
3. The Arbitrator Is Without Effective Tenure 
Whether judges should be appointed or elected has provided 
matter for argument since the early nineteenth century. Some 
believe that only by appointment, subject to good behavior, can 
the judge be protected from the pressures around him which will 
inevitably influence his decisions. 55 When we compare judges and 
arbitrators in this respect, the significant point is that, whether 
appointed or elected, a judge has more tenure than the labor ar-
bitrator. In the typical ad hoc case the arbitrator has no tenure. 
Even in the umpireship he is under a contract which, if they so 
desire, the parties may terminate by purchase, though it still has 
some time to run. 
51 1948 FED. MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERV. ANN. REP. 22. 
52 McPherson, Labor Courts in Western Europe, Ill. Bus. Rev., Nov. 1961, p. 6. 
53 Cf. 1961 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN BAR Ass'N SECTION OF LAlloR RELATIONS 
LAW 33. 
54 Braden, Policy and Practice of the American Arbitration Association, in NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF ArulITRATORS, MANAGEMENT RIGIITS AND THE ArulITRATION PROCESS, PROCEED· 
INGS OF THE 9nr ANNUAL MEETING 85 (McKelvey ed. 1956). 
55 See Schrader, Judicial Selection: Taking the Courts Out of Politics, 46 A.B.A.J. 
lll5 (1960). 
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It may be that tenure it not a significant concept when applied 
to the labor arbitrator. Dean Shulman once said: 
"A proper conception of the arbitrator's function is basic. 
He is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by 
superior authority which the parties are obliged to accept. 
He has no general charter to administer justice for the com-
munity which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a 
system of self-government created by and confined to the 
parties. He serves their pleasure only, to administer the rule 
of law established by their collective agreement. They are 
entitled to demand that, at least on balance, his performance 
be satisfactory to them, and they can readily dispense with 
him if it is not."56 
Even if one disagrees with Dean Shulman as to the character 
of the arbitrator, it is apparent that the tenure problem which 
one associates with the courts does not fit the arbitrator. In the 
ad hoc case, tenure is, by definition, impossible. Moreover, by far 
the greatest number of men who engage in arbitration as neutrals 
do not rely on it for their livelihoods. Many of them are college 
professors, practicing Ia-wyers, or consultants. Their economic 
security is not threatened by failure of the parties to invite them 
to serve in future cases. 
Insofar as there is a tenure problem in labor arbitration, it 
is probably pretty well confined to the permanent umpireships. 
Economic security for such individuals is doubtless important, 
but hardly overriding, since they are invariably men of such stat-
ure in the field that they can quite readily shift from one set of 
clients to another. The influence of a lack of tenure, if there is 
one, is probably much more subtle. May want of tenure tend to 
stifle the kind of inventiveness which has characterized the great 
judges? Dean Rundell once told the following delightful story 
about a court faced with a hard decision: 
"In a case which came before a Supreme Court a brother was 
claiming the estate of his father against his sister on grounds 
that seemed incontrovertible. The Chief Justice said to one 
of his juniors, 'We cannot let that rascal rob his sister. It is 
up to you to find a way to enable us to prevent it being done.' 
The junior, later telling the story, said that after much fruit-
less search he finally sufficiently recalled from his student days 
an obscure and rarely applied principle to enable him to 
trace it to its long forgotten source, a source sufficiently 
u6 Shulman, supra note 40, at 1016. 
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authoritative to warrant its application to the immediate 
case which was done to the frustration of the grasping brother 
and the satisfaction of the court. So frank a confession of a 
search for legal reasons to justify a decision based on reasons 
that could not be avowed is not often found, but it is but an 
exaggeration of what must sometimes if not often take 
place.''57 
A number of permanent umpires have commented on the 
"strict construction" canon which they feel must govern the 
umpire. In explaining the John Deere-UAW system, Umpire 
Harold Davey said of incentive grievances: 
"Not infrequently, cases have arisen where in my judgment 
equitable considerations dictated payment of average earn-
ings, but where contractually one or more of the requisite 
conditions had not been satisfied. Such decisions are difficult 
to make and even more difficult to accept. However, in terms 
of the judicial theory of arbitration, the contract itself must 
always be the touchstone. If contract requirements and equity 
do not appear to coincide, the contract governs.''58 
In the same vein, Gabriel Alexander said of his philosophy 
while umpire under the GM-UAW contract: 
"When the parties come to the umpire they encounter a 
pretty rigid kind of realism: that is, what does the agreement 
say?, and if the answer therein is clear there is no escape from 
it. Such an answer may not be so good for one side or the 
other or both. But if the agreement compels it, the umpire 
does not change it upon considerations of policy, expediency 
or philosophy."59 , 
Both of these umpires claimed to follow a "judicial" approach to 
arbitration. This explanation contrasts nicely with Professor Ful-
ler's assertion that, if any generalization can be justified, it is that 
judges, rather than arbitrators, are the ones who are inclined to 
play fast and loose with contract language. One of several examples 
which he cites in support of this proposition is the following: 
"A enters a contract with B to render a performance sched-
uled to begin July 1st. On May 15th, A repudiates his agree-
ment and tells B he is not going to perform. B brings suit on 
May 16th. A alleges that the suit is premature; his promise 
was to begin performance on July 1st. Until that date arrives, 
57 Rundell, The Judge as Legislator, U. Kan. City L. Rev., Aug. 1958, pp. 1, 8. 
58 Davey, supra note 29, at 181. 
59 Alexander, supra note 12, at 144. 
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he cannot be guilty of a breach of contract for he has promised 
nothing before then. For more than a century British and 
American courts have generally allowed B to recover. Why, 
they ask, should B have to wait around for July 1st to arrive 
when A has already told him he is not going to perform? If 
a promise is needed, we can say that in committing himself 
to begin performance on July 1st, A impliedly promised not 
to repudiate his obligation meanwhile. This result has often 
been criticized by legal scholars as an unprincipled rewriting 
of the words of the contract. It has become, however, accepted 
law."60 
For the reasons we have suggested, tenure is not of the same 
order of importance in maintaining independence on the part of 
the arbitrator as is the case 1Yith the judge. If insecurity of tenure 
plays some part in encouraging caution on the part of permanent 
umpires, this may very well be exactly what the parties wish. 
Under what is probably the oldest permanent industry-wide 
grievance machinery in the country, that involving the Anthracite 
Board of Conciliation, established in 1903, the umpire is ad-
monished, for instance, to decide grievances "which arise in rela-
tion to the industry agreement, using as literal an interpretation 
as possible.''61 
4. Inclusion of Partisan Members on the Arbitration Tribunal 
Both in the United States and abroad there is a long history 
of lay judges who sit as members of the court. Vermont still uses 
them, as does Sweden. The purpose of such a system is presum-
ably to give the "law" judge the benefit of the advice of persons 
who may be more familiar with the every-day affairs of the people 
than is the judge. But even in this kind of case, lay judges are 
not partisan in the sense that they espouse the cause of one side 
or the other. 
Many collective bargaining contracts call for arbitration by a 
tripartite board. In point of fact, such boards are frequently 
waived at the time of the hearing and the neutral member pro-
ceeds on his own. In other cases, the partisan members are officially 
recorded on the decision but they do not sit on the tribunal at 
the time of the hearing and they do not meet with the neutral 
arbitrator after the hearing is over. Often they present the case 
for the parties. If there is ever a meeting of the entire board, it 
60 Fuller, supra note 17, at 13. 
61 SLICHTER, HEALY &: LIVERNASH, THE IMPACT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGE· 
MENT 743 (1960). (Emphasis added.) 
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is more likely to be in the nature of an opportunity for the neutral 
arbitrator to test out his thinking than conducted with any thought 
of influencing the decision. 
As a practical matter, the presence of partisan members on 
an arbitration tribunal achieves much the same end as the equity 
practice of submitting a master in chancery's report to the parties 
before it is returned to the court. 62 In both cases there is a desire 
to give the parties a chance to react before a final decision is made. 
The arbitration procedure might also be compared to the com-
mon practice of courts in announcing a decision and then asking 
counsel for one side to draw an appropriate order to be sub-
mitted to the other side and then to the court for approval. 
In theory the partisan members of an arbitration board might 
out-vote the neutral. In this event the decision-making process 
loses its adjudicatory character and becomes one of bargaining. 
It is also possible for the partisan members to introduce new con-
siderations into the deliberations of the board and thus subvert 
the hearing process. Both of these things can and do happen, 
though rarely. There is nothing necessarily insidious when such 
does happen. I remember a highly controversial discharge case, on 
which I sat, in which, after a thorough discussion in which it was 
agreed that an employee committed offenses worthy of discharge, 
the partisan board members then engaged in a searching analysis 
of whether it would be "better" for the welfare of both parties 
and the future operation of the plant to reinstate the off~nding 
employee. In the course of this deliberation there came under dis-
cussion many factors not entered in the record at the hearing, but 
within the mutual knowledge of the partisan members. 
Partisan membership on arbitration boards would doubtless 
be more acceptable to theoreticians and academicians if the form 
were changed to reflect the substance. This would mean that the 
partisan members would simply be designated as advisers. Under 
the U.S. Steel-USWA umpire system this change has, in fact, 
been brought about, and the advisers are available to the umpire 
on a post-hearing basis. It is doubtful, however, that any wide-
spread move in this direction will be made; there is little pressure 
for such a change of formula, and there is a considerable emotional 
attachment in both labor and management circles to the tripartite 
board. This pattern probably reflects the suspicion with which 
both sides have always viewed outside agencies which meddle in 
their affairs. It is noteworthy that even in the Western European 
62 1 PUTERBAUGH, CHANCERY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 216, at 326 (7th ed. 1930). 
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countries, which have gone the route of labor courts as dis-
tinguished from our private arbitration tribunals, the courts 
are usually tripartite in nature.63 
5. The Emphasis on "Acceptability" in Arbitration Awards 
To say that arbitrators are preoccupied with the acceptability 
of their awards and that the courts are indifferent is greatly to 
distort both situations. Until recently, the Supreme Court had 
consistently refused to take jurisdiction over reapportionment 
cases because it saw little likelihood that it could come up 
with a solution which would be acceptable.64 Federal judges in 
the South have been tormented with the problem of implement-
ing Supreme Court decisions in the integration area without meet-
ing mass resistance.65 State judges, elected in constituencies having 
strong union organization strength, are undoubtedly troubled 
about the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes. On the other 
hand, arbitrators worry very little in the routine grievance case 
over whether the decision will be acceptable. Nevertheless, there 
are institutional reasons why arbitrators tend to be somewhat 
more concerned with acceptability as a criteria than are the courts. 
There may also be institutional reasons why acceptability is easier 
to achieve. Both of these propositions deserve examination. 
Many of the present corps of neutral arbitrators are products 
of the World War II War Labor Board experience. They have 
literally grown up with arbitration. They started at a time when 
the emphasis was on getting the parties into agreement. They 
remember that grievance arbitration was often imposed upon the 
parties by War Labor Board decree and that its survival in a 
peacetime economy depended in large measure on acceptance by 
the parties. They know from intimate experience that arbitration 
is the substitute for the strike and the lockout, and that the parties 
can return to a show of strength at any time that the process of 
arbitration becomes unacceptable to them. Finally, they have had 
indelibly impressed upon their minds the fact that, unlike the 
situation in the typical court case, the parties must continue to 
live together after the decision. Added to all this may be a factor 
of survival for the arbitrator, for in the absence of any tenure his 
continuation is clearly dependent upon making decisions which 
are acceptable to the parties. 
63 McPherson, supra note 52. 
64 E.g., in Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946), the Court dismissed a reappor-
tionment case, sa}ing that the question was "political." Contra, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186 (1962). 
65 PELTASON, FIITY-EIGHT LONELY MEN ch. 9 (1961). 
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There is another side to the "acceptability" coin. If arbitrators 
are more inclined to be concerned with the acceptability of their 
decisions than are courts, it may also be true that such an end is 
easier for them to achieve. Controversial though the labor-man-
agement relations area may be, arbitration is normally limited 
to interpretation of the contract on whith the parties have al-
ready agreed. Furthermore, there exists substantial agreement 
upon certain values which undergird the arbitration structure. 
Such values may be stated in this way: 
1. Union representation of employees in a free industrial 
society is inevitable. 
2. Given the existence of unions, the most desirable of the 
available alternatives for resolving labor-management 
problems is collective bargaining. 
3. An integral part of collective bargaining is the settlement 
of grievances, and a mechanism for doing so is advanta-
geous to both sides. 
4. A "rule of law" concept is applicable to contract adminis-
tration, hence impartial arbitration is both logical and 
desirable as a final step in the grievance process. 
5. Since "rights," rather than "interests," are at issue, the 
stakes are limited. 
Labor and management may subscribe to these propositions 
with varying degrees of enthusiasm; however, if serious disagree-
ment between the parties should develop, deletion of the arbitra-
tion clause is quite likely-in which case the problem of accept-
ability disappears. Thus, the arbitrator renders his decisions in 
the context of a situation in which the parties have hedged their 
chances of serious damage. The courts are not so fortunate. 
If one could equate only those court and labor arbitration 
cases in which difficult and intricate on-going human relationships 
were involved, perhaps there would be little difference in the im-
portance which judges and arbitrators would attach to the factor 
of acceptability of the decision. But the court normally does not 
have to worry about the continuing relationship between litigants. 
Even in divorce cases it is possible for the parties to pick up their 
separate lives and start over. Inevitably, therefore, the labor ar-
bitrator does assign more importance to acceptability than does 
the judge. Whether this is good or bad is not the point. The 
mere fact that he does it points up a significant difference between 
the two forums. 
There is one situation in which it may be argued that the im-
portance of acceptability is carried too far. This concerns the so-
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called "agreed" award. 66 In such a case the parties have actually 
reached a mutually acceptable decision which has been commu-
nicated to the arbitrator and the hearing is only for the record. 
This situation is not as unsavory as it may sound, though most 
arbitrators are frankly uneasy about it.61 It probably occurs most 
frequently in "interest" cases involving the terms of a new con-
tract. Often the economics of the industry are such that an un-
popular decision must be enforced, and the only way to do it is 
through a third-party proceeding. This may not differ much from 
the situation in which the judge, in a divorce, custody, or mental 
health proceeding, accepts the advice of counsel as to the best 
solution, though this advice is not always known to the client. 
Nevertheless, the area is a sensitive one and subject to under-
standable criticism. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The use of arbitration as a tool for the settlement of labor dis-
putes was initially largely confined to strike situations involving 
the terms of a new contract. It is therefore not surprising that 
the term "arbitration" was often used interchangeably with "con-
ciliation" and "mediation." Moreover, this very fact offers some 
historical explanation for the presence on modern arbitration tri-
bunals of partisan members, and perhaps for the fact that accept-
ability to the parties is the hallmark of a successful arbitration 
award. 
The great growth and development of labor arbitration has 
come since World War II, principally as a third-party procedure 
for settling differences as to the meaning and interpretation of 
contracts. Because this kind of a proceeding looks more like a 
"judicial" type proceeding than it once did, and because the 
court is the inevitable model for an accepted type of judicial pro-
ceeding, there is a continuing effort to compare the two types of 
tribunals. It is suggested that there are at least five significant 
points of difference between courts and labor arbitration tribunals: 
(1) the arbitrator is a "private" judge who administers a "private" 
system of jurisprudence over which labor and management hold 
joint sovereignty; (2) the arbitrator, unlike the judge, is the choice 
of the parties to hear their dispute; (3) the arbitrator is without 
66 Wirtz, Due Process of Arbitration, in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS, THE 
ARBITRATOR AND THE PARTIES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 11TH ANNUAL MEETING 1 (McKelvey 
ed. 1958). 
61 Fleming, Some Problems of Due Process and Fair Procedure in Labor Arbitration, 
13 STAN. L. REv. 235, 248 (1961). 
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effective tenure; (4) the arbitration board frequently includes 
partisan members; and (5) a greater emphasis is placed upon ac-
ceptability of an award by an arbitration tribunal than is the case 
with the decision of a court. 
It is further suggested that some of these differences can be 
explained by the history of labor arbitration and the kinds of cases 
which are brought before such tribunals. Furthermore, some of 
the differences between courts and labor arbitration tribunals are 
minimized if one looks below the surface. Thus, the presence of 
partisan members on an arbitration tribunal may, in fact, simply 
mean that they are functioning as advisers to the neutral member, 
and that the procedure is not unlike the situation when the judge 
issues a tentative decision and asks for the comments of counsel 
for the respective parties before making the decision final. 
Perhaps the most fundamental of the differences between courts 
and labor arbitration tribunals is in their different orientation 
toward the question of the acceptability of the award. This differ-
ence may be largely institutional. The arbitration tribunal is in 
the unique position of always dealing with the same parties liti-
gant. Furthermore, those parties must continue living together 
after a decision is announced. A greater premium naturally at-
taches to their acceptance of an award which must govern their 
actions in the future. An interesting and coincidental effect which 
this may have is to make the arbitrator more cautious than the 
judge in exercising ingenuity in difficult situations. If this is so, 
and it is suggested here that it is, it means that, contrary to popu-
lar impression, the arbitrator is much less of an innovator than is 
the judge. 
A comparison between courts and labor arbitration tribunals 
is valuable in increasing the understanding of both. But, in the 
final analysis, the success or failure of the arbitration tribunal will 
not lie in its identification with the adjudicatory processes of the 
courts, but in its fulfillment of certain basic tests. Those tests 
might be phrased as follows: 
1. Does the process accord the parties a fair and impartial 
hearing in the due process sense? 
2. Is it administratively efficient? 
3. Is it serving a socially constructive purpose? 
4. Is it sufficiently flexible to meet the challenges of the future? 
On the record one can, with relatively minor exceptions, an-
swer most of those questions in the affirmative. 
